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Abstract 
This paper describes a natural framework for rules , 
based on belief functions , which includes a repre­
s entation of numerical rules, default rules and rules 
allowing and rules not allowing contraposition. In 
particular it justifies the use of th e Dempster-Shafer 
Th eory for representing a particular class of rules , 
Belief calculated being a lower probability given cer­
tain independence assumptions on an underlying 
s pace. It s h ows h ow a belief function framework can 
be generalised to other logics ,  including a general 
Monte-Carlo algorithm for calculating belief, and 
h ow a version of Reiter's Default Logic can be seen 
as a limiting case of a belief function formalism. 
1. Introduction 
Rules used by people are often not completely re­
liable so any attempt to represent them must cope 
with the conclusion of the rule sometimes being in­
correct. Numerical approaches do this by giving 
some kind of weighting to the conclusion of an un­
certain rule; non-monotonic reasoning, a symbolic 
approach, ensures that these rules are defeasible, so 
that their conclusions could later be retracted if nec­
essary. 
There has been little work done, however, on relat­
ing numerical and symbolic techniques, an exception 
being the work of Adams [Adams, 66] further devel­
oped by Geffner and Pearl [Geffner, 89; Pearl, 88] 
where a. logic is produced from probability theory, 
by tending the probabilities to 1. 
This paper shows how a belief function approach can 
represent numerical rules, both those allowing con­
traposition and those not allowing contra.position, 
and how default rules may be viewed as the lim­
iting case of such rules, when the certainty of the 
rule tends to 1. This allows the integration of the 
Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) [Shafer, 76] and Re­
iter's Default Logic [Reiter, 80], hence enhancing the 
understanding of both. 
* This research was carried out as part of 
t he ESPRlT basic research action DRUMS 
(3085) 
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Section 2 deals with the representation of numeri­
cal rules within DST, 2.1 giving an interpretation 
of the type of rule that DST typically represents; 
2.2 presents a belief function framework that allows 
the theory to be generalised to other logics, and 2.3 
shows how the framework can be applied to include 
rules which don't allow contraposition. Section 3 
deals with the representation of default rules within 
the framework: 3.1 reformulates Reiter's Default 
Logic and defines a modified extension (equivalent 
to Lukaszewicz's); 3.2 shows how the belief function 
framework can be turned into a logic and 3.3 shows 
how to represent default rules within this logic. Sec­
tion 4 indicates how priorities between rules can be 
represented, and Section 5 suggests how numerical 
and default rules could be used together within the 
framework. 
2. Numerical Rules 
Expert Systems like MYCIN [Buchanan and Short­
liffe, 84) use uncertain rules of the form If a then c 
: (a-), where a- is the some measure of how reliable 
the rule is. There are many ways of interpreting such 
a rule. We consider a natural interpretation which 
leads to the standard Dempster-Shafer representa­
tion of rules. 
2.1 J ustifying DST Representation of Rules 
The standard way of representing ·the rules If a; 
then c; : (a-;) (for i= 1, . . .  , m) with the Dempster­
Shafer Theory is, for each rule to produce a simple 
support function with mass a-; allocated to the ma­
terial implication a; _. c; and the remaining mass 
1 - o; allocated to the tautology, and then to com­
bine these simple support functions by repeated ap­
plication of Dempster's Rule. Pearl has criticised 
this representation for its behaviour under chaining 
and reasoning by cases. However it turns out that 
this DST approach represents a very natural type of 
rule. 
The uncertain rule may in fact be an approximation 
to the certain rule n/\a -+ c where n is an unknown 
antecedent or one too complicated to be easily ex­
pressed by the expert but which they judge to be 
true with probability o. After all '. . . uncertainty 
measures characterise invisible facts, i.e., exceptions 
not covered in the formulas' [Pearl, 88, p2]. 
Since n 1\ a -+ c is logically equivalent to n 1\ ...,c -+ 
...,a, such a rule allows contraposition, and since it's 
also logically equivalent to n _. (a -+ c) , this rule 
may also be interpreted 
In a proportion o of worlds (or situations) we know 
th e material implication a -+ c is true. 
If we represent such a rule by a simple support func­
tion, as described above, Belief is just the probability 
that we know a -+ c to be true, so that it's a lower 
probability for a -+ c. Similarly if we have a num­
ber of such rules, a; -+ c; ( i = 1, ... , m) , represent 
them as simple support functions and combine these 
with Dempster's Rule, Belief is a lower probability, 
given certain independence assumptions on the n;s. 
Consider now the typical Reasoning by Cases situa­
tion: we're given two rules If a then c: {Ql) and If 
-.a then c : (Q2) which we'll interpret as uncertain 
material implications n1 1\ a -+ c and n2 1\ -.a -+ c 
with Pr(n;) = Q;, i = 1, 2. 
Pearl argues that any reasonable measure of belief 
should obey the Sandwich Principle: deducing from 
those two rules that belief in c should be between 
Q1 and Q2; the Dempster-Shafer approach however 
gives that Bel( c) = Ql Q2. 
But it is clear why the Sandwich Principle is violated 
for this approach: knowing either a or -.a increases 
our knowledge and hence our belief. In worlds where 
n1 1\ -.n2 is true, c may be always false if a is always 
false; in the event -.n1/\ n2, c may be always false if 
a is always true, and in the event -m1 1\ -.n2 there 
is no constraint on c so c may again always be false. 
Only in the event n1 1\ n2 can we be sure that c 
is true, so making the assumption of independence 
of n1 and n2 (which is reasonable without contrary 
knowledge) we get Bel( c) , the probability that we're 
in a world where we know c to be true, is Q1a2. 
This type of rule can also be chained: 
n1 1\ a -+ b and n2 1\ b -+ c with Pr(n;) = a;, 
(i = 1, 2) leads to (n1 1\ n2) 1\ a -+ c, and again 
assuming independence of n1 and n2 this gives 
Pr(n1 /\n2) = a1a2. If we now learn that a is true we 
get Pr( c) � a1 a2 and so Bel( c) = a1 a2, the result 
given by application of Dempster's Rule. 
Of course the assumption of independence of the n;s 
will not always be valid-if correlations between the 
rules are known they should be (and can be) incor­
porated. 
The Dempster-Shafer approach is thus a natural, 
formally justified as well as a computationally ef­
ficient way (see [Wilson, 89] and section 2.2) to rep­
resent If-Then rules. 
2.2 The Sources of Evidence Framework 
We will be interested in extending DST to other log­
ics (see [Saffioti, 90] for other work on this, and see 
[Ruspini, 87] for a justification of DST using a modal 
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logic of knowledge). A natural way to extend Demp­
ster's multi-valued mapping [Dempster, 67] is as fol­
lows: 
We have a mutually exclusive and exhaustive set 0 
with a probability function P on it, and we're inter­
ested in the truth of formulae in L, where L is the 
language of some logic. With each 7] E n is associ­
ated a set K'1 (� L): the set of all formulae known 
to be true given that '7 is true. For a formula dE L, 
Bel( d) is defined to be the probability that we know 
d to be true i.e., 
Bel(d) = L P(77) = L P(77). 
'1"1:=>d !7=K�3d 
Justifying Dempster's Rule for general belief func­
tions is problematic* so we restrict ourselves to the 
combination of a finite number of simple support 
functions and, to justify this, use the Sources of Ev­
idence framework (based on Shafer's random sources 
canonical example [Shafer, 87]; see [Wilson, 89] for 
details). 
Suppose we have distinct propositions n;, i = 
1, ... , m, (not in L) and for each we have a prior 
probability Q;. Suppose also that we know that if n; 
is true, some evidence Evd; is also true, where Evd; 
is a statement about the logic (it might for example 
be that the material implication a; -+ c; is true, as 
in section 2.1). If n; is not true we know nothing 
about the truth of Evd;. 
We also allow there to be a set of facts W which are 
known certainly to be true. 
n; may, as the name of the framework suggests, rep­
resent the event that a source of evidence, which tells 
us evidence Evd;, is reliable. Alternatively n; may 
be an unknown antecedent of a rule, as described in 
the last section; or ni may just be some event for 
which, when it occurs, we are sure that the evidence 
Evd; is true. 
Let 'lu be the elementary event 
1\ n; A 1\ -.n; 
iEu if" 
and let n be the mutually exclusive and exhaus­
tive set of elementary events { T/u : u � { 1, . . .  m} } . 
Take some probability function P on 0. 
* For example there is the problem of the collaps­
ing of the Belief-Plausibility interval, e.g., [Pearl, 
89]; see also Shafer's presentations of his random 
codes canonical example, with discussion [Shafer, 
82a, 82b]. 
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If we think ofP as saying, for each 1]11, the probability 
that we are in a world in which f111 is true, then Bel( d) 
is the probability that we are in a world in which we 
know d is true. 
Bel maybe viewed as a lower probability given the 
probability function P on the underlying space n. 
It is argued in [Wilson, 89] that, in the absence of 
correlation information on the n;s, certain assump­
tions (A) and (B) are entirely reasonable. (A) is 
roughly that, since an unreliable source/rule doesn't 
give us any information, it shouldn't affect the prob­
abilities (an example of the application of this as­
sumption is given below in 2.3); (B) is that, if the 
sources are not contradictory (i.e., /\';' n; is not 
known to be impossible) then we take, for each i, 
P(n;) to be a;, its prior value. These assumptions 
determine a unique probability function P08 given 
by 
pDS(c:.,) = { 0, jk 
p., ' 
if K., inconsistent, 
otherwise, 
where k = I: p., K.consistent 
and p., =IT a; ITC1- a;) . 
iEo i�11 
This is, in fact, the probability function that leads to 
Dempster-Shafer belief when each Evd; is that some 
proposition p; is true: the belief as defined above will 
be the same as that calculated by using Dempster's 
Rule to combine simple support functions with mass 
a; attributed to the proposition p;, i = 1, ... , m. 
Since Belief, as defined here, is just 'randomised 
logic' the calculation of Belief inherits its compu­
tational efficiency from that of the underlying logic: 
Bel( d) can be calculated, using the following Monte­
Carlo algorithm: 
For each trial:-
(i) Pick u with probability P(q.,) 
(ii) If K., 3 d then trial succeeds else trial fails. 
The proportion of successful trials then converges to 
Bel( d). 
Given that P( '1u) is not too hard to calculate, the 
calculation takes time proportional to the time it 
takes to check if d E Kt!, but with a fairly large 
constant term corresponding to the number of trials 
needed to get reasonable accuracy. 
With the probability function P = P05, step (i) can 
be performed very easily. Since any sensible measure 
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of belief should collapse to the logic for the extreme 
case, its computational efficiency cannot hope to be 
better than that of the underlying logic. Thus the 
calculation of Dempster-Shafer belief is as fast, up to 
a constant, as the calculation of a measure of belief 
could possibly be. In particular it is shown in [Wil­
son, 89] that (up to arbitrary accuracy) Dempster­
Shafer Belief on a mutually exclusive and exhaustive 
frame of discernment can be calculated in time ap­
proximately linear in the number of evidences and 
size of the frame of discernment. 
2.3 Rules Not Allowing Contraposition 
Some rules do not allow contraposition. For exam­
ple the rule Typically males don't have long beards 
seems reasonable, and even mildly informative, but 
on meeting someone with a long beard, it would be 
unreasonable to deduce that they were female. In 
order to represent rules not allowing contraposition, 
inference rules such as a/ c will be used which, like 
the rules used in many Expert Systems, given a, al­
low the deduction of c, but given -.c, do not allow 
-.a to be deduced. 
Suppose we have a set of rules If a; then c; : 
(a;) for i = 1, . . . , m, (a;s and c;s closed wffs in 
first order logic) for which we do not wish to allow 
contraposition. Let I = {a; / c; : i = 1, ... , m} 
where the (certain) inference rule a; I c; means 'if 
we know a; we can deduce c/, and let I., = {a; I c; : 
ieu}. 
For some set U of closed wffs and set of inference 
rules J we define Th1 (U) to be the logical closure of 
U when all the inference rules in J are added to the 
logic i.e., the set of formulae obtained by applying 
all the inference rules in J repeatedly to U, so that 
Th1 (U) is the smallest set r such that 
(i) r 2 u, 
(ii) Th(r) = r and 
(iii) if a I c E J and a E r then c E r' 
where Th(r) means the logical closure of r within 
first order logic. 
Abbreviate Th1 .. (W) to Th17(W). 
To represent this set of rules within the sources of 
evidence framework we make the ith evidence be 
that the inference rule ai I c; is added to the logic 
(so that whenever a; is known, c; may be deduced). 
To be precise, we set K., to be Tht! (W). 
This includes the uncertain material implications, 
described in 2.1, as a special case: make, for all i, 
the ith inference rule equal T I (a; - c;) . 
Example 
Whilst attempting to deduce information about our 
acquaintance Nixon we learn that he is a quaker and 
a republican, so that W = {quaker,republican}. 
Two rules, If quaker then pacifist : Ca-1) and 
If republican then -,pacifist : (a-2) are also 
known. 
To represent these we take Evd1 to be that the first 
rule is correct and that the corresponding inference 
rule quaker /pacifist should be added to the logic, 
and similarly for Evd2. 
Thus if n1 then, if at any time we learn quaker, we 
will deduce pacifist. This gives 
Ke = Th(W) = Th( {quaker, republican}) 
K{l} = Th(W U {pacifist}) 
K{2} = Th(W u {-,pacifist}) 
K{l,2} = Th(W U {pacifist, ...,pacifist}). 
Since K{1,2} is inconsistent, P(nt /\n2) must be 0. In 
order to come up with a probability function P we 
make certain independence assumptions. Knowing 
only about one rule, the first, we would obviously 
take P(n1) = a-1; adding an unreliable second rule 
doesn't give us any information so shouldn't change 
this probability i.e., we make the assumption that 
P(n1l..,n2) = O't. Symmetrically we make the as­
sumption P(n2j-.nt) = a-2. Both these assumptions 
are instances of assumption (A) mentioned above in 
2.2. Only in worlds when n1 1\ -.n2 is true (when 
u = {1}) do we know pacifist, and only in worlds 
-.nl 1\ n2 (u = {2}) do we know -.pacifist, so 
If the reliabilities of the two rules are the same then 
Bel(pacifist) = Bel(-.pacifiat). If, on the other 
hand, the first rule is very reliable, but the second 
isn't so reliable then Bel(pacifist) will be close to 
1 and Bel( -.pacifist) will be close to 0. 
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3. Default Rules 
An alternative to rules with numerical uncertainty 
are default rules-in the absence of information in­
dicating that the circumstances are exceptional, the 
rule is fired, though the consequence of the rule may 
later have to be retracted, if it's discovered that cir­
cumstances are in fact exceptional. 
3.1 Default Logic 
Reiter's Default Logic [Reiter, 80) is a logic for rea­
soning with default rules. A default rule is a rule of 
the form 'If we know a then deduce c, as long as b 
is consistent', or a : b I c for short. 
Let � = ( D, W) be a closed default theory where L 
is the language of a first order logic, W � L, a set of 
closed wffs, are the facts and D is the set of default 
rules { a; : b; . } -c-; : '= 1, . .. ,m 
where a;, b; and c; are closed formulae, for each i. 
It turns out that Reiter's default logic can be ex­
pressed in terms of inference rules. Let I = {a; I c; : 
i = 1, . . . , m}. The behaviour of the defaults in D 
will be mimicked by use of the corresponding infer­
ence rule in I. 
Let S =  {Th"Y(W): -y � {l, ... m}}. S contains all 
the sets of formulae produced by applying different 
subsets of the inference rules to W. 
For some K E S an inference rule a; I c; may have 
been applied even though b; is inconsistent (i.e., 
-.b; e K), in which case the inference rule was not 
behaving like the corresponding Default rule. Then 
we say that K is A-inconsistent. Formally this prop­
erty can be defined as follows: 
K E S is �-consistent if and only if there exists a 
-y � {1, ... m} with K = Th"Y(W) and K � -.b; for 
all i e 1'· 
In default logic the extensions are intended to be 
the different possible completions, using the default 
rules, of an incomplete set of facts about the world. 
Theorem 1: E is an extension if and only if E = 
Th"Y(W) where i = { i : -.b; fl. E }. 
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This shows that extensions are �-consistent sets in I S. In fact we have 
Theorem 2: If E is an extension of A then E is a 
maximal �-consistent set in S. 
Definition: E is said to be an M-extension of .0. 
if E is a maximal .6.-consistent set inS. 
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M-extensions are formed by applying 8S many in­
ference rules as possible without contradicting �­
consistency. Theorem 2 showed that extensions are 
always M-extensions. 
Theorem 3: Let � be a closed normal default 
theory. Then E is an extension of Ll if and only if 
E is a maximally �-consistent set in S. 
Thus for closed normal default theories E is an ex­
tension if and only if E is an M-extension. 
M-extensions have for general closed default theories 
the nice properties extensions only have for closed 
normal default theories: 
Theorem 4: Every closed default theory has an 
M-extension. 
Theorem 5 (Semi-monotonicity): Let Ll = 
(D, W), �' = (D', W) be closed default theories 
with D � D'. If E is an M-extension of � then 
there exists an M-extension E' of�' with E' ;;2 E. 
We ca.n also define an M-default proof, in a.n obvious 
way, which is complete, that is for any dosed wff p 
there is an M-default proof of p if and only if p E E 
for some M-extension E. 
It might be suggested that any M-extension of a de­
fault theory which is not an extension is not a sen­
sible completion of one's knowledge: this however 
is not the case e.g., there are apparently coherent 
default theories that allow no extension (see [Wil­
son, 90] for an example, and also for proofs of the 
above results) but which, by Theorem 4, allow M­
extensions. 
M-extensions turn out to be the modified extensions 
defined in [Lukaszewicz, 84] (also see [Besnard, 89]). 
3.2 The Sources of Evidence Framework 
as a Logic 
To turn the Sources of Evidence Framework into a 
Logic, we tend the reliabilities of the sources (the 
a is) to 1. B-extensions are the sets of formulae 
whose belief can be made to tend to 1. We can 
consider Bel as a function Bel(g:,p) where .9: = 
(at. a2, ... , am) is the vector consisting of the re­
liabilities of all the sources. 
To use the Sources of Evidence framework to pro­
duce a logic we require that for any closed wff p, 
Bel(p) tends to either 0 or 1. A B-extension is then 
the set of formulae whose belief tends to 1. 
Formally E is a B-extension if and only if 
for i = 1, .. . , m there exist monotonic functions ai : 
[1, oo) - [0, 1) with ai (z) tending to 1 as z tends 
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to infinity, and given £ > 0 there exists N, such that 
for all z > N, and for all p E L 
Bel(g:(z),p) > 1- £ if pEE 
Bel(g:(z),p) < £ if p �E. 
Example Continued 
In the case of Nixon we have 2 B-extensions. When 
the reliability of the first rule tends to 1 much 
faster than that of the second rule we get that 
Bel(pacitist) tends to 1, and Bel(-.paci:fist) 
tends to 0 so K{l} = Th(W U {pacifist}) is a B­
extension. 
Similarly K{2} = Th(W U {-.pacifist}) is a B­
extension. 
Theorem 6: If E is a  B-extension then E = Ku 
for some u. 
If we don't have information about correlations be­
tween the sources we can reasonably make assump­
tions (A) and (B) giving p = p08. 
Theorem 7: With P = P08, E is a  B-extension 
if and only if E = K 17 for some u maximal with K 17 
consistent. 
3.3 Representation of Default Rules in 
Sources of Evidence Framework 
Default rules will be represented in the Sources of 
Evidence framework by treating them rather like nu­
merical rules with a high, but unknown, certainty: 
roughly speaking we make the ith evidence Evd; be 
that the inference rule ai I Ci is a correct rule, as we 
did in 2.3, and take the limit as the reliabilities of 
the sources (that is, the certainties of the rules) tend 
to 1, to produce the B-extensions. 
In the example we found that the B-extensions were 
just the same as Reiter's extensions. This was no co­
incidence: when the probability function pDS on 0 is 
used the B-extensions are exactly the M-extensions 
of the default theory. 
3.3.1 Closed Normal Default Theories 
Let � be a closed normal default theory. We want 
the ith evidence to be that the inference rule ai I Ci 
is a correct rule, so, formally, we set Kt? = Th17(W), 
and also set P = P08. 
Theorem 8: Let � be a closed normal default the­
ory. With the above representation of Closed Nor­
mal Default rules within the Sources of Evidence 
framework 
E is a B-extension <=> E is an M-extension of .6. 
<=> E is an extension of .6.. 
3.3.2 General Closed Default Theories 
We again set P = P05. To represent the consistency 
condition b; we have to be a little trickier. We first 
add new distinct symbols q1, ... , qm to the alphabet 
of the language to get a new language L'. 
We want the statement of the ith source to be that 
inferences rules a; / q;, q; / c;, -.b; / -.q; are correct 
rules. The idea is that knowing a; will enable us to 
deduce c; unless -.b; is known, in which case we will 
get an inconsistency since we'll know both q; and 
-.q;. 
To be precise we let K� � L' be the theorems of W 
when the inference rules 
a; q; -.b; . Ju = {-, - , - : a E u} 
q; C; -.q; 
are added to the logic, that is, K� �rTh'"' (W). 
We're only interested in the wffs in L so let Ku be 
K� n L, so that Ku is K� stripped of all formulae 
mentioning some q;. 
This gives the following result: 
Theorem 9: With the representation of Default 
rules in the Sources of Evidence framework described 
above, for any set of closed wffs E 
E is a B-extension if and only if E is an M-extension. 
4. Expressing Preferences between Rules 
Suppose we have two rules, If penguin then 
-.:flies : (al), and If bird then :flie1 : 
Co2), and two facts, W ={penguin, bird}. 
Expressing these as inference rules gives, as in the 
Nixon example, 
ansmg from assumptions P(n1l....,n2) = o1, 
P(n21-.nl) = a2. 
But since we know that penguins are a subclass of 
birds it seems that the first rule should override the 
second: if we only knew about the first rule we would 
get Bel( -.:flies) = 01 which should not be changed 
on learning the second rule. 
The preference of some sets of rules over others are 
represented by making some different assumptions 
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on the probability function P that reflect that pref­
erence. 
In this case we specify P(nl) = o1 (since P(n1) 
should be unaffected by the addition of a second 
rule), and P(n2l....,n1) = 02 is still an intuitive as­
sumption to make. 
This gives P(n1 A n2) = 0, since K{l,2} is inconsis­
tent, P(n1 A -.n2) = 01, P(-.nl A n2) = (1 -ol)a2, 
P(-.nlA-.n2) = (1-ol)(l-o2), and Bel(-.:flies) = 
o1, Bel(:flies) = (1- al)o2. 
Here Th( {penguin, bird, -.flies}) is the only B­
extension. 
5. Combining Numerical and Default Rules 
It has been shown how the Sources of Evidence 
framework can represent either numerical rules, or, 
taking the limit as the reliabilities of the rules tend 
to 1, default rules. The next step is to combine both 
within this framework. 
Suppose that our knowledge includes both default 
rules and numerical rules. F irst we represent both 
as evidences, which add an inference rule to the logic, 
in the sources of evidence framework (which includes 
the contrapositioning rules as a special case). We 
first consider only the default rules, and produce the 
B-extensions. Then we add the other rules/sources 
to get a belief function in each B-extension. 
For dE L, BEL.(d) is defined to be the minimum value of Bel( d) over the extensions, a rather conser­
vative measure; BEL.(d) is defined to be the maxi­
mum value of Bel(d). If BEL.(d) is high this gives 
at least some reason for believing d: there is some 
combination of default rules which if correct lend 
high support to d. Some average of Bel over the 
extensions could also be a useful measure. 
Another way of looking at this is to consider Bel 
as a function of the unknown, but high reliabilities 
g_ = (alJ ... , am)· BEL.(d) is then info-1Bel(g_,p), and BEL.(d) is supg__1Bel(g_,p). 
- -
6. Concluding Comments 
We have given counter-arguments to some of Pearl's 
criticisms of the use of belief functions to represent 
rules and argued that the Dempster-Shafer Theory 
is a natural way to represent a type of If-Then rule. 
If it is known that the rules are correlated, then the 
independence assumptions may well not be justified, 
and so a more general belief function approach such 
as the sources of evidence framework is needed to 
allow the dependencies between the rules to be in­
corporated in the underlying probability function P. 
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Dependencies must also be used, as described in sec­
tion 4, to represent dominance of certain rules (or 
chains of rules) over others. We have shown that 
this belief function approach also enables the repre­
sentation of default rules. 
Another very natural type of rule H a then c : 
(a) related to that described in 2.1 is where, again, 
there is an unknown antecedent n with n 1\ a - c, 
but instead of knowing the prior probability of n, 
we know the conditional probability P(n la) = a. 
With a number of such rules we can take, as before, 
Belief as a lower probability, tend the a;s to 1 and 
see which Beliefs tend to 1. This is effectively the 
approach taken by Adams, Geffner and Pearl. It 
would be interesting to explore whether progress can 
be made by making independence assumptions on 
the n;s, as we did for the type of rule described in 
2.1. 
It is clear that there is no single correct way of rep­
resenting numerical If-Then rules. Future research 
in this area should attempt to clarify wha.t different 
types of numerical rule there are, a.nd to represent 
them within a single framework. 
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